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THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT AND ETHICAL 
CORPORATE CLIMATES: WHAT THE MEDIA 
REPORTS; WHAT THE GENERAL PUBLIC 
KNOWS 
Cheryl L. Wade* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The question for participants in the Securities Regulation Section’s 
program at the 2008 AALS Annual Meeting was whether recent securities 
regulation reforms hit their mark. I focus in this essay on The Sarbanes-
Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX or the Act),1 the most important legislative reform 
of securities markets in recent decades.2 Enacted to assuage public outrage 
about corporate greed and malfeasance ignited by media reports describing 
debacles at Enron, WorldCom, Adelphia, Tyco and other companies in 
2001 and 2002 (the Corporate Scandals)3, SOX represented a legislative 
and political response to public resentment of what some considered a 
morally impaired corporate America. 
In the immediate aftermath of its enactment, the mark at which SOX 
took aim was the allaying of public indignation. The mark was not only the 
protection of investors, or reviving their confidence in U.S. markets. SOX 
also took aim at the general public by attempting to redeem corporate 
America’s public image. Donald Langevoort sees the Act as reflecting “a 
political instinct that incentive structures in modern public corporations 
generate risks that require public (not just investor) accountability to be 
legitimate.”4 He observes that some of the Act’s provisions “address the 
public interest.”5 
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 1. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified in scattered 
sections of 11, 15, 18, 28, and 29 U.S.C.A. (2003)). 
 2. See, e.g., Peter Tirschwell, Why Sarbanes-Oxley Matters in Logistics, J. COM., Sept. 27, 
2004, at 54. 
 3. See Tom Petruno, Tech Probes Cost Twice; Alleged Abuse of Options Takes Toll on 
Confidence and Financial Results—And on Share Prices, L.A. TIMES, July 9, 2006, at C1. 
 4. Donald C. Langevoort, The Social Construction of Sarbanes-Oxley, 105 MICH. L. REV. 
1817, 1820 (2007) (emphasis added). 
 5. Id. at 1830. There are two references to the interests of the general public in the section of 
SOX that establishes the Public Company Accounting and Oversight Board (the PCAOB). Section 
101 establishes the PCAOB in order to protect the interests of investors and to further the public 
interest. Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 101. Section 101(e) provides that the PCAOB is to have five 
members “who have a demonstrated commitment to the interests of investors and the public.” 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 101(e). Another section requires the Securities and Exchange Commission 
to promulgate rules in the public interest that would require attorneys to report instances of 
422 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. [Vol. 2 
Aware of increased public scrutiny, it is clear that in the immediate 
aftermath of the Corporate Scandals, business leaders were concerned with 
their public images. Politicians, legislators and regulators made speeches 
about corporate responsibility.6 These factors conflated to create a social 
and political climate that inspired business leaders to construct corporate 
climates in which the consideration of ethical business practices would take 
center stage. This new focus on ethical business climates extended beyond 
issues relating to financial reporting and other traditional corporate 
governance matters. There is evidence that business leaders were open to 
cultural and climate changes that would benefit not just shareholders but 
stakeholders also.7 
The discourse about SOX has shifted in recent years. Praise for SOX is 
dramatically outweighed by criticism and complaints, primarily from 
corporate directors, managers and others within the business community.8 
The business community’s exuberant criticism of SOX has reversed the 
brief trend to place discussions about ethics at the forefront of corporate 
governance discourse. It is also clear that now, more than five years after its 
enactment, the Act’s mark is construed more narrowly, focusing only on the 
investing, rather than the general, public. The legislation’s goal shifted from 
one of restoring public confidence to restoring and maintaining investor 
confidence. 
Only a fragment of the population participates in today’s discourse 
about SOX. This is significant because it changes the parameters of 
corporate and legislative accountability. The general public no longer has 
easy access to (or interest in) news about the Act’s shortcomings, or the 
changes in the way the Act is interpreted or implemented. This may affect 
the nature of the business community’s compliance with the Act’s 
principles. The general public’s power to influence the behavior of business 
leaders who care about their public image disappears when the public is 
unaware. If the public is no longer paying attention, the business 
community no longer needs to concern itself with its public image. 
II. THE CHANGING DISCOURSE ON SOX AND ETHICAL 
CORPORATE CLIMATES 
A. 2002–2004 (APPROXIMATELY) 
In the two years immediately after its enactment, SOX had the potential 
to foster more ethical corporate climates at U.S. firms. Professor Lynne 
                                                                                                                 
material securities violations or fiduciary duty breaches to certain corporate agents. Sarbanes-
Oxley Act § 307. 
 6. See, e.g., Elisabeth Bumiller, Bush Faces Scrutiny over Disclosing ‘90 Stock Sale Late, 
N.Y. TIMES, July 4, 2002, at A11. 
 7. See infra p. [6]. 
 8. See discussion infra Part II.B. 
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Dallas describes a company’s ethical climate as “a manifestation of its 
corporate culture. Corporate culture is defined as a ‘complex set of common 
beliefs and expectations held by members of the organization,’ which are 
based on shared values, assumptions, attitudes and norms.”9 Dallas explains 
that the “[e]thical climate . . . answers such questions as . . . ’What is the 
correct alternative in the organization’s view?;’ and . . . ’What should I 
do?’”10 Another commentator explains, more generally, 
Ethics . . . is the branch of philosophy which studies how moral decisions 
and positions are justified. . . . Ethics consists of general systems of 
principles that one can use to evaluate moral beliefs, resolve moral 
disputes, and rationally determine a moral course of conduct.11 
Steve Kardell, an attorney representing shareholder activists, seized the 
opportunity created by SOX’s enactment to inspire more ethical corporate 
climates.12 In the immediate months after SOX was enacted, some business 
leaders, worried about their companies’ public images, were open to 
requests from Kardell to carefully evaluate their firms’ ethical climates. In 
2002 and 2003, Kardell asked corporate boards to review their codes of 
ethics and compliance programs, particularly the companies’ commitment 
to protecting whistleblowers. Kardell used demand, one of the procedural 
prerequisites to shareholder derivative litigation13, to do so. He wrote 
demand letters to the boards of several companies with codes and 
compliance programs that seemed to be cosmetic only, asking them to 
revise their codes and compliance programs.14 His goal was to close the gap 
between the companies’ “ethical policies and ethical actions.”15 
                                                                                                                 
 9. Lynne L. Dallas, A Preliminary Inquiry Into the Responsibility of Corporations and Their 
Officers and Directors for Corporate Climate: The Psychology of Enron’s Demise, 35 RUTGERS 
L.J. 1, 2–3 (2003). 
 10. Id. at 22–23. 
 11. Frank J. Cavico, Private Sector Whistleblowing and the Employment-At-Will Doctrine: A 
Comparative Legal, Ethical, and Pragmatic Analysis, 45 S. TEX. L. REV. 543, 628 (2004). 
 12. See Telephone Interview with Steve Kardell, Kardell Law Group (Oct. 14, 2003) 
[hereinafter Kardell Interview] (cited in Cheryl L. Wade, “We Are an Equal Opportunity 
Employer”: Diversity Doublespeak, 61 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1541, 1572–74 (2004)). 
 13. Derivative litigation is an equitable resolution created by courts to allow shareholders to 
file suits against corporate boards and managers on behalf of the corporation. Without this 
equitable remedy, shareholders would not have standing to file the litigation because the cause of 
action belongs to the corporation as a “person,” separate from its shareholders. See Cohen v. 
Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 548 (1949). Because the possibility of bringing a 
derivative claim against boards and managers also presents an opportunity for shareholders to 
harass directors and officers by bringing unwarranted suits, courts have created procedural 
prerequisites that must be satisfied before filing a derivative claim. Demand is one such 
prerequisite. See Grimes v. Donald, 673 A.2d 1207, 1215–16 (Del. 1996); Marx v. Akers, 666 
N.E.2d 1034, 1036–37 (1996). 
 14. Kardell Interview, supra note 12. 
 15. Lynne Dallas described assessments of the efficacy of codes of ethics and hotlines for 
whistleblowers, noting that the most important “factor in reducing observed unethical conduct . . . 
is consistency [within the organization] between ethical policies and actions . . . .” Dallas, supra 
note 9, at 42. 
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Kardell expected that boards would refuse his shareholder clients’ 
demands to fix ineffective compliance programs and codes of ethics. He 
intended to litigate the refusal, arguing that it was wrongful.16 To Kardell’s 
surprise, however, the boards of the companies he contacted did what he 
asked. Instead of refusing his demand, they revised codes of conduct and 
strengthened compliance programs and whistleblower protections. 
In a telephone interview, Kardell explained that after the Act’s passage, 
it was more difficult for boards to get opinion letters from outside counsel 
stating that compliance programs were adequate.17 The boards he contacted 
took corrective action because SOX and the accompanying discourse about 
corporate responsibility and ethics inspired them to do so.18 At least in the 
two years after its enactment, SOX inspired corporate boards to focus on 
their public images. The boards contacted by Kardell responded favorably 
to his demands because it seemed that the public was watching. 
One of the issues on which Kardell focused was on the problem of 
retaliation against whistleblowers. Interestingly, Kardell did not limit his 
focus to employees who reported their companies’ failures to comply with 
disclosure and accounting rules. He asked that boards draft strong language 
in their codes of conduct explicitly prohibiting retaliation or conduct that 
would impede the professional advancement of employees who complained 
about social issues such as sexual harassment and discrimination.19 
Kardell’s goal was to get boards to construct corporate climates that would 
allow employees with material information regarding noncompliance to 
reveal what they know. Kardell’s success in persuading corporate boards 
evidenced the willingness of business leaders, in the immediate aftermath of 
SOX’s enactment, to improve codes of conduct and compliance programs 
in a way that would establish more ethical corporate climates that would 
benefit both shareholders and stakeholders. 
B. TODAY’S DISCOURSE 
It is not likely that Kardell would get the same level of responsiveness 
from corporate boards now that more than five years have passed since 
SOX’s enactment. Criticisms about the Act exuberate. The business 
community’s complaints about SOX’s shortcomings have replaced 
discussions about business ethics, the important work that whistleblowers 
                                                                                                                 
 16. A shareholder demand letter may ask that the board file a suit that will recover the 
company’s losses, or that the board take some corrective action that would prevent future 
corporate loss. Corporate boards have the right to refuse a shareholder’s demand. See generally 
Grimes, 673 A.2d 1207. When demand is refused, the shareholder’s only recourse is to argue that 
the refusal of the shareholder’s demand was wrongful. But, the board’s decision to refuse 
shareholder demand is protected by the business judgment rule. See Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 
430 A.2d 779, 784 (Del. 1981). 
 17. Kardell Interview, supra note 12. 
 18. Id. 
 19. Id. 
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do and investor protection. Now that criticisms of SOX permeate the 
business community, Kardell spends much of his time defending 
whistleblowers who claim that their employers have retaliated against 
them.20 The nature of the discourse about SOX has changed dramatically. 
The broad goal of achieving more ethical corporate climates seems less 
likely to make it to the top of the agendas of corporate boards and 
managers. 
It is critical to examine today’s discussion of SOX in order to evaluate 
the Act’s perceived and actual effectiveness. Some regulators, institutional 
investors and academics focus on the Act’s benefits.21 There are 
commentators who argue that the Act has the potential to prevent future 
corporate fraud.22 They caution against calls to roll back the legislation 
because of “the steady stream of corporate fraud revelations” that continue 
to arise years after SOX’s enactment, citing the “accounting issues at 
Fannie Mae and options backdating at Apple.”23 Other commentators 
chronicle the improvements in internal controls, corporate governance and 
financial audits as companies comply with SOX.24 
Some legal scholars, however, began to doubt the efficacy of SOX soon 
after its enactment.25 For example, Roberta Karmel was concerned that 
some SOX provisions would reduce flexibility and “diminish[] 
entrepreneurial activity, corporate profitability and competitiveness. The 
new emphasis on investor protections may detract attention from long-term 
business interests.”26 At the time of its enactment, the Act’s most frequently 
                                                                                                                 
 20. Kardell represented two former Wal-Mart employees who claimed that they were fired 
because they reported corporate malfeasance ranging from an executive’s misuse of corporate 
funds to oppressive labor practices. See Michael Barbaro, Wal-Mart Fights Whistle-Blower Suits, 
WASH. POST, July 9, 2005, at D1. 
 21. See Scott Harshbarger & Goutam U. Jois, Looking Back and Looking Forward: Sarbanes-
Oxley and the Future of Corporate Governance, 40 AKRON L. REV. 1, 6 (2007). 
 22. Id. at 5. 
 23. Id. at 6. 
 24. See generally Daniel L. Goelzer, Auditing Under Sarbanes-Oxley: An Interim Report, 7 J. 
BUS. & SEC. L. 1 (2007) (pointing out the positive effects SOX has had on auditing since its 
enactment); Milton Ezrati, Taking a Second Look at SOX, ON WALL ST., Apr. 1, 2007, 
http://www.onwallstreet.com/asset/article/529371/taking-second-look-sox.html?pg= (discussing 
the costs and benefits of SOX). 
 25. See, e.g., Michael A. Perino, Enron’s Legislative Aftermath: Some Reflections on the 
Deterrence Aspects of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 76 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 671 (2002). Perino 
observed that SOX duplicates already-existing law, regulation and standards and is unlikely to 
deter criminal conduct in the future. Id. at 673; see also Brian Doherty, You Can Be Too Careful, 
REASON, Jan. 2006, at 40. Legislatively, SOX did not change much, at least not from the 
perspective of criminal liability. Executives at Enron, WorldCom and Adelphia were successfully 
prosecuted after SOX’s passage, but they were not prosecuted or convicted under the Act. 
HealthSouth CEO Richard Scrushy was prosecuted under SOX, but a jury found him not guilty. 
See id. 
 26. Roberta S. Karmel, Realizing the Dream of William O. Douglas—The Securities and 
Exchange Commission Takes Charge of Corporate Governance, 30 DEL. J. CORP. L. 79, 79 
(2005). Professor Karmel noted that “[w]hether Sarbanes-Oxley will result in better corporate 
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articulated goal was to boost investor confidence, but critics question 
whether investors truly benefited.27 There are significant numbers who 
argue that compliance with the Act has made companies that are listed on 
U.S. stock exchanges less competitive than companies listed elsewhere.28 
Other commentators lament the high costs of compliance with provisions 
such as Section 404,29 even though there is evidence that these costs are 
declining.30 
The Act’s most rancorous critics belong to the business community. 
According to a survey described in CFO Magazine, 94% of executives from 
217 companies wanted to “tone down” SOX.31 Another study, by 
Korn/Ferry International, revealed that more than half of U.S. directors 
want SOX “repealed or overhauled.”32 Seventy-two percent of directors 
surveyed in the U.S. said SOX “made them too cautious,”33 and that they 
are “not taking the necessary risks to drive growth. . . . [Fifty-nine percent] 
of directors surveyed in the Americas have declined a board position due to 
the risk associated.”34 
                                                                                                                 
governance and greater sensitivity by corporate officers and directors to investor interests remains 
to be seen.” Id. at 81. 
  Professor Karmel’s concern about the impact of a focus on protecting investors on long-
term business interests seems misplaced. “Long-term business interests” is a term that is 
hopelessly vague. Almost anything can be deemed to be in the long-term interests of the 
corporation, shareholders, or stakeholders. In any event, it would seem that long-term business 
interests must certainly include the protection of investors. If an entrepreneur wants to focus on 
long-term business interests, whatever they are, rather than investor protection, she should do so 
with her own money or with bank financing. She should not look to investors for capital. 
 27. See, e.g., Louis M. Thompson, Jr., Sarbanes-Oxley Means Opportunities and Challenges 
for Companies and IROs, CPA J., Sept. 2005, at 14. The “‘compliance by checklist’ mode with 
respect to disclosure and corporate governance . . . may provide assurance that a company is 
following the rules, [but] it is debatable whether investors are better off for it.” Id. 
 28. See, e.g., Emma Trincal, Chamber Pushes Regulatory Reform, HEDGEWORLD DAILY 
NEWS, Mar. 12, 2007; Robert Schroeder & Greg Robb, Regulations, Litigation Criticized at 
Conference, MARKETWATCH, Mar. 13, 2007, http://www.marketwatch.com/news/story/paulson-
business-leaders-hit-red/story.aspx?guid=13F2929C-B876-4D26-ACBE-2963DC97443F&print= 
true&dist=printTop (reporting that New York City’s Mayor and Senator Charles Schumer (D-
N.Y.) warned that “New York City is in danger of losing its preeminence as the world’s main 
financial center because companies are seeking to do business elsewhere” so that they do not have 
to comply with SOX). 
  Some observe, however, there are other reasons why the number of initial public offerings 
has decreased in U.S. markets and that they are not less competitive because of SOX. Goelzer, 
supra note 24, at 6–8. 
 29. See infra notes 43–44 and accompanying text. 
 30. See Goelzer, supra note 24, at 7; Aaron Siegel, Research Shows Compliance Costs Rev 
Up, INVESTMENT NEWS, Mar. 12, 2007, at 6 (asserting that in the past two years costs of 
complying with SOX have dropped). 
 31. Tim Reason, Feeling the Pain: Are the Benefits of Sarbanes-Oxley Worth the Cost?, CFO 
MAGAZINE, May 2005, at 51, 54. 
 32. Chris Evans, Directors call for Sarbanes-Oxley Repeal, ACCT. AGE, Feb. 23, 2006, 
http://www.accountancyage.com/accountancyage/news/2150885/sarbanes-story. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. 
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There is an aspect of board membership that may explain the pervasive 
view among corporate directors and executives that SOX should be 
overhauled. Commentators have observed that groupthink my render group 
members blindly uniform in their beliefs, even when those perspectives are 
erroneous.35 Groupthink renders “group members . . . uniform in their 
views” seeing “only the positive, not the negative, about group attitudes and 
behavior.”36 It is “a group dynamic [that] binds group members together 
and blinds them to their failings and abuses.”37 Group members “will 
collectively discipline any member who fails to stand uniformly behind the 
group’s perspective and are dismissive, even contemptuous, of those 
outside the group and of views other than their own.”38 These observations 
based on social psychology may explain the sweeping criticism of SOX. 
The inner circle, or corporate elite, is unified in its criticism of SOX, but 
this anti-SOX discourse may be the result of groupthink among the business 
inner circle. 
Another phenomenon of board membership may explain why most 
directors are critical of SOX. Commentators have observed that because 
most directors are chosen from a small network of people who belong to 
many of the same organizations, a closely knit group is created.39 Because 
one director is likely to serve on several boards, ideas or even rumors about 
the merits of corporate governance reform expressed at one large 
company’s board meeting are likely to spread to almost all other boards of 
large corporations in a matter of months.40 Interlocking board memberships 
create a cluster of individuals among whom ideas spread easily.41 Monthly 
board meetings and a “small-world network” of directors combine to 
provide the ideal opportunity for spreading practices, strategies and rumors 
among business leaders.42 Anti-SOX discourse spreads easily from board to 
board. 
                                                                                                                 
 35. See Marleen O’Connor, The Enron Board: The Perils of Groupthink, 71 U. CIN. L. REV. 
1233 (2003). 
 36. James Fanto, Whistleblowing and the Public Director: Countering Corporate Inner 
Circles, 83 OR. L. REV. 435, 462 (2004) (concluding that groupthink may explain why so many 
members of the corporate inner circle either participated in, or failed to object to the behavior that 
led to the corporate scandals). 
 37. Id. at 441. 
 38. Id. at 462. 
 39. See Gerald F. Davis, Mina Yoo & Wayne E. Baker, The Small World of the American 
Corporate Elite, 1982-2001, 1 STRATEGIC ORG. 301 (2003). 
 40. Id. at 320–21. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. at 321. 
428 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. [Vol. 2 
III. CURRENT IMPLEMENTATIONS OF AND INTERPRETIVE 
CHANGES TO THE ACT 
A. SECTION 404: FINANCIAL REPORTING CONTROLS 
Much of the criticism of SOX has focused on Section 404, the most 
contentious of the Act’s provisions. Section 404 requires managers to 
create, maintain and test processes that monitor internal controls over 
financial reporting, thereby decreasing the likelihood that financial 
statements will contain material inaccuracies. Even though the costs of 
complying with 404 have decreased in each of the three years after the 
provision became effective, the business community complains 
vociferously that compliance costs outweigh the benefits provided under 
404.43 Business leaders lament that they have far too little time to spend on 
attending to core business issues because so much time, money and effort 
go into 404 compliance.44 They express concern that the time and effort 
invested in complying with the internal control and reporting requirements 
reduce the type of innovation that makes businesses profitable. This has 
been especially problematic for smaller companies. Also, the enhanced 
auditing requirements have strained relationships between clients and their 
auditors. Firms complain that overzealous auditors focus on irrelevant 
minutiae, further wasting managers’ time and the shareholders’ money. 
In the years immediately after SOX’s enactment, the SEC provided no 
guidance for managers with respect to complying with Section 404.45 In 
June, 2007, however, the SEC responded to the business community’s 
concerns about the costs of complying with 404 by issuing interpretive 
guidance46 that the SEC’s Deputy Chief Accountant says is “not a 
retrenchment” of 404.47 The SEC’s Deputy Chief Accountant described the 
principles on which the SEC’s interpretive guidance is based: 
The first principle is that management should evaluate whether it has 
implemented controls that adequately address the risk that a material 
misstatement in the financial statements would not be prevented or 
detected in a timely manner. The second principle is that management’s 
                                                                                                                 
 43. Kara Scannell, Moving the Market: Costs Fall Again for Firms To Comply With Sarbanes, 
WALL ST J., May 16, 2007, at C3. “Total compliance costs in 2006, the third year companies have 
had to follow the new rules, fell 23 percent . . . from the prior year. That is 35 percent lower than 
the first year. . . .” Id.; see also Amy Borrus, Learning to Love Sarbanes-Oxley, BUS. WK., Nov. 
21, 2005, at 126–28 (describing some companies’ being able to “cut costs and boost productivity” 
as an effect of complying with Section 404). 
 44. Joe DosSantos, Master Data Management as a Compliance Solution, SEC. INDUSTRY 
NEWS, June 18, 2007, at 4. 
 45. See John W. White, Dir., Div. of Corporation Fin., SEC, Statement: SEC’s Proposed 
Interpretive Guidance to Management for Section 404 of Sarbanes-Oxley Act (May 23, 2007), 
available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2007/spch052307jww.htm. 
 46. Rules and Related Matters, SEC NEWS DIG., June 21, 2007. 
 47. Kara Scannell, Moving the Market: Softening a Sarbanes-Oxley Thorn; SEC Makes 
Progress on Tweaking the Rules for Unpopular Provision, WALL ST. J., Apr. 5, 2007, at C2. 
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evaluation of evidence about the operation of its controls should be based 
on its assessment of risk.48 
In other words, the SEC advises managers to focus on the risk that financial 
statements will contain material inaccuracies in order to comply with 404.49 
The Commission declined to provide more specific guidance, rules or 
examples because the Commission staff wanted management to focus on 
the principle of risk and how it operates at a manager’s particular 
company.50 A list of specific rules, standards or examples would inspire 
managers to take an approach under 404 that would have them simply 
ticking off items on an articulated checklist. This approach would have 
managers focus on form rather than substance or principles. The changes to 
404 take aim at the check-the-box approach that managers have taken: 
We’re re-orienting 404 to focus on what truly matters to investors—and 
away from expensive and unproductive make-work procedures that waste 
investors’ money and distract attention from what’s genuinely material. 
No longer will the 404 process tolerate procedures performed solely so 
someone can claim he considered every conceivable possibility.51 
A rules-based approach may require managers to consider matters not 
relevant to their firms and the risk that their firms’ financial statements may 
be materially misleading.52 The SEC’s principles-based interpretation of 
404 is aimed at avoiding this type of inefficiency. SEC Chairman 
Christopher Cox predicted that principles-based compliance that focuses on 
the risk of material financial misstatements will be particularly beneficial 
for smaller companies:53 
Compliance costs should come down because the new SEC guidance 
that’s been developed specifically for management will allow each small 
                                                                                                                 
 48. Zoe-Vonna Palmrose, Deputy Chief Accountant, SEC, Statement: SEC’s Proposed 
Interpretive Guidance to Management for Section 404 of Sarbanes-Oxley Act (May 23, 2007), 
available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2007/spch052307zvp.htm. 
 49. Commission Announcements, SEC NEWS DIG., May 5, 2007. 
 50. Id. “In adopting the revisions [to 404’s interpretation] . . . regulators said small companies, 
in particular, should benefit by being able to focus audits on financial records that appeared to 
present the greatest risks of fraud.” Robert Schroeder, Regulators Asked for Sarbanes-Oxley 
Costs, MARKETWATCH, June 12, 2007, http://www.marketwatch.com/news/story/regulators-
asked-sarbanes-oxley-costs/story.aspx?guid=%7BC6871C12-7A3C-4F9F-BBCB-36D95CA474E 
E%7D. 
 51. Christopher Cox, Chairman, SEC, Testimony Concerning Section 404 of the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act and Small Business Before the H. Comm. on Small Business (June 5, 2007), available 
at http://www.sec.gov/new/testimony/2007/ts060507cc.htm; Robert Schroeder, Further Tweaks 
Urged for Sarbanes-Oxley, MARKETWATCH, Feb. 26, 2007, 
http://marketwatch.com/news/story/further-tweaks-urged-sarbanes-oxley/story.aspx?guid=%7B80 
E96DF9-A846-4624-B3F0-98133388BE2F%7D (noting that under the new guidelines corporate 
managers have more flexibility in preparing financial reports because the new guidance does not 
require “every financial control to be checked”). 
 52. See Palmrose, supra note 48. 
 53. Cox, supra note 51. 
430 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. [Vol. 2 
business to exercise significant judgment in designing an evaluation that is 
tailored to its individual circumstances. Unlike external auditors, 
management in a smaller company tends to work with its internal controls 
on a daily basis. They have a great deal of knowledge about how their firm 
operates. Our new guidance allows management to make use of that 
knowledge, which should lead to a much more efficient assessment 
process.54 
The PCAOB coordinated with the SEC to make changes in the way 
auditors comply with Section 404 that are similar to the changes made 
under the Commission’s 404 interpretive guidance for corporate 
management.55 Auditing Standard No. 5 has replaced the original internal 
control auditing standard articulated in Auditing Standard No. 2.56 The new 
standard for auditors, like the guidance given management, incorporates a 
principles-based approach that focuses on the risk that a particular 
company’s financial statement would contain material misinformation.57 
This approach, like the approach to be taken by management, allows 
auditors to customize their audits according to important risks.58 This means 
that auditing costs for smaller, less complex companies will not be 
unreasonably high because auditors will not spend time investigating details 
that are not related to the risk of disclosure inaccuracies. Auditors are 
encouraged to use “professional judgment in the 404 process, particularly in 
using risk-assessment”59 and in “determining when and to what extent the 
auditor can use the work of others.”60 
B. SECTION 806: WHISTLEBLOWERS 
Another section of the Act that vividly illustrates a context in which 
conclusions about the applicability of SOX have narrowed is Section 806. 
                                                                                                                 
 54. Id. 
 55. Press Release, Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., Board Approves New Audit Standard 
for Internal Control Over Financial Reporting and, Separately, Recommendations on Inspection 
Frequency Rule (May 24, 2007), available at http://www.pcaobus.org/News_and_Events/ 
News/2007/05-24.aspx. 
 56. Id. See generally Press Release, SEC, SEC Approves PCAOB Auditing Standard No. 5 
Regarding Audits of Internal Control Over Financial Reporting; Adopts Definition of “Significant 
Deficiency” (July 25, 2007), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2007/2007-144.htm 
(describing the improvements of Auditing Standard No. 5 over No. 2). 
 57. Press Release, Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., supra note 55. 
 58. Robert Schroeder, Accounting Board OKs Sarbanes-Oxley Changes, MARKETWATCH, 
May 24, 2007, http://www.marketwatch.com/news/story/accounting-board-streamlines-sarbanes-
oxley-rules/story.aspx?guid=%7B0F1CDE25-ED55-4045-9460-5ED6BF079BE7%7D. 
 59. Press Release, SEC, SEC Commissioners Endorse Improved Sarbanes-Oxley 
Implementation to Ease Smaller Company Burdens, Focusing Effort on ‘What Truly Matters’ 
(Apr. 4, 2007), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2007/2007-62.htm; see also Robert 
Schroeder, SEC Agrees to Coordinate Auditing Proposals, MARKETWATCH, Apr. 4, 2007, 
http://www.marketwatch.com/news/story/sec-agrees-coordinate-auditing-proposals/story.aspx?gui 
d=%7B52D19FEB%2DFC9E%2D4B14%2DBA07%2DF4C99BC351A5%7D. 
 60. Press Release, SEC, supra note 59. 
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This section prohibits employers from retaliating against employees who 
report conduct the employees reasonably believe to be “a violation 
of . . . any rule or regulation of the Securities and Exchange Commission, or 
any provision of [f]ederal law relating to fraud against shareholders.”61 
Section 806 also protects employees who report conduct they reasonably 
believe to be a violation of four criminal statutes: “Frauds and Swindles;”62 
“Fraud by wire, radio or television;”63 “Bank fraud;”64 and “Securities 
Fraud.”65 
It seemed that by enacting Section 806, Congress understood the 
importance of corporate whistleblowers and the need to protect them from 
employer retaliation. The author of a 2003 practice-oriented article 
observed that corporate employers’ careful compliance with SOX’s 
whistleblower provisions would “foster an ethical atmosphere within the 
company.”66 He predicted that “Sarbanes-Oxley’s mandated ethics rules 
will have a substantial impact on corporate organization, culture and 
procedures.”67 Moreover, in describing the Act’s potential to establish more 
ethical corporate climates, the author predicted that SOX’s impact would 
extend beyond the narrow context of fraud against investors. He believed 
that SOX compliance would promote “the creation of an ethical corporate 
environment that stresses compliance with all applicable employment laws 
throughout the company.68 SOX “can provide the catalyst to create a 
corporate culture that encourages early internal reporting, prompt and 
thorough investigation, and constructive resolution of employee complaints, 
whether related to fraud or other inappropriate conduct. Such actions will 
not only limit whistleblower lawsuits, they will instill investor 
confidence.”69 
These predictions about the impact of SOX and its protection of 
whistleblowers did not come to fruition. Whistleblower litigation under 
SOX in the years since its enactment has yielded a narrow interpretation 
and application of Section 806. For example, an employee at Northrup 
Gruman Synoptics revealed that his supervisors submitted false internal 
reports, misclassified internal expenses, and that one used the company’s 
contractors to remodel his home.70 The administrative law judge who heard 
                                                                                                                 
 61. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 806, 18 U.S.C.A. § 1514A (2006). 
 62. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1341. 
 63. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1343. 
 64. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1344. 
 65. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1348. 
 66. Mark R. Attwood, When The Whistle Blows: Renewed Enthusiasm Among Employee 
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 68. Id. at 1161. 
 69. Id. at 1178 (emphasis added). 
 70. Marshall v. Northrup Gruman Synoptics, Case No. 2005-SOX-00008, at 2 (Dep’t of Labor 
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the case held that Section 806 did not apply to protect the Northrup 
employee because his whistleblowing merely related to his supervisors’ 
violations of the company’s internal ethical standards.71 In another case, an 
employee revealed that her supervisor engaged in the unethical handling of 
mutual fund accounts, resulting in unjustified charges to clients.72 An 
administrative law judge held that Section 806 did not protect her.73 These 
two cases demonstrate how the discourse about ethics has narrowed since 
2002. The Act’s protection of whistleblowers does not extend to employees 
who reveal conduct that is “merely” unethical. 
Commentators have concluded that whistleblower protection under 
Section 806 is inadequate for a variety of reasons.74 The high failure rate for 
whistleblowers who bring retaliation claims,75 coupled with the business 
community’s discourse about the Act’s shortcomings, reduces the 
likelihood that whistleblowers trust that the protection from retaliation 
articulated in the Act is real. Unlike some members of the general public 
who may be apathetic and/or uninformed about the current discourse about 
the shortcomings of SOX, whistleblowers are vividly aware of the vitality 
with which the Act is criticized. 
Whistleblowers may not feel adequately protected under Section 806 
because administrative law judges have narrowly construed the applicability 
of whistleblower protection.76 Also, because corporate executives, directors 
and other business leaders are almost united in their criticism of SOX,77 
their solidarity on this issue is a factor that will likely discourage 
whistleblowers from coming forward with information. Of course, there are 
other factors that contribute to the vulnerability of whistleblowing 
employees, but anti-SOX discourse is especially chilling in the corporate 
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 71. Id. at 5. 
 72. Barnes v. Raymond James & Assoc., Case No. 2004-SOX-58, at 4 (Dep’t of Labor Jan. 10, 
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 73. Id. at 6. 
 74. See, e.g., Beverley H. Earle & Gerald A. Madek, The Mirage of Whistleblower Protection 
Under Sarbanes-Oxley: A Proposal for Change, 44 AM. BUS. L.J. 1 (2007); Miriam A. Cherry, 
Whistling in the Dark: Corporate Fraud, Whistleblowers, and the Implications of the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act for Employment Law, 79 WASH. L. REV. 1029 (2004). 
 75. See Stewart S. Manela, Blowing the Whistle on Fraud in Companies, NAT’L L. J., Mar. 8, 
2004, at S1 (noting that “[s]o far, most whistleblower charges have not been upheld”). 
As of March 21, 2006, 714 Sarbanes-Oxley whistleblower cases had been filed with the 
Department of Labor . . . . Six hundred nineteen cases have been completed . . . . Of these . . . 454 
were dismissed, 92 were withdrawn, and 96 were determined to have merit (resulting in 81 
settlements). Debra S. Katz, Whistleblowing, Sarbanes-Oxley, and Retaliation Claims, SM097 
ALI-ABA 487, 489 (2007). 
 76. See supra notes 71–73 and accompanying text. 
 77. See discussion infra Part IV.B. 
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environment, easily silencing employee whistleblowers who do not want to 
jeopardize their careers. 
The silence of potential whistleblowers is one of the casualties in the 
war against the Act waged by some members of the business elite. The 
vulnerability of whistleblowers vividly illustrates how SOX has missed its 
mark. Protection for whistleblowers under 806 could have extended to those 
who reported material facts that, if left unreported, would serve to 
undermine a company’s ethical climate. Whistleblowers and the 
information they provide protect investors and the public interest, but SOX 
inadequately protects whistleblowers. In a climate where whistleblowers 
feel vulnerable, investors become more vulnerable because it will be less 
likely that corporate malfeasance will be reported. 
IV. PARTICIPANTS IN TODAY’S DISCOURSE ABOUT SOX 
Understanding the nature of today’s discourse about SOX requires 
identification of the participants in the discourse. Donald Langevoort 
identified the participants in what he calls the social construction of SOX as 
follows: corporate executives, institutional investors, the securities industry, 
accountants and auditors, lawyers, regulators, the media and corporate 
employees.78 Missing from Langevoort’s list, however, is the American 
public. Langevoort does not discuss the general public’s role in the social 
construction of SOX, even though he noted that some of the Act’s 
provisions aim beyond investors and address the public interest.79 
Fifty-five percent of the American public own interests in public 
companies through pension plans.80 
[T]he overriding objective of securities regulators is to encourage greater 
public participation in the capital markets by strengthening transparency 
and investor protection . . . [t]he . . . increased reliance on private 
investment to fund individual retirement, and the dismantling of state-run 
savings plans . . . create tremendous pressure to take steps to increase the 
general public’s willingness to invest in equities.81 
Members of the general public who own stock indirectly through 
retirement plans and pension funds (“indirect investors”) participate in the 
discourse about SOX through fund managers.82 It seems, however, that 
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 80. John Biggs, former Chairman & CEO of TIAA-CREF, Keynote Address at Loyola 
University Chicago School of Law Symposium: Emerging Issues: Integrated Risk Management 
and Corporate Governance (Apr. 20, 2007). 
 81. Daniel L. Goelzer, Auditing Under Sarbanes-Oxley: An Interim Report, 7 BUS. & SEC. L. 1 
(2007). 
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members of the general public who are not part of the investing class, and 
who are not indirect investors, are excluded from the discourse. 
A. PUBLIC PARTICIPATION IN TODAY’S DISCOURSE ABOUT SOX 
The 2002 discourse about SOX was directed at the general public 
because of the outrage expressed by some Americans concerning their 
perceptions of pervasive corruption within corporate America. Donald 
Langevoort has noted the public nature of SOX discourse in 2002.83 
Michael Perino observed that SOX was the result of politicians who 
engaged in “political grandstanding”84 as a response to “the public outcry 
over seemingly widespread corporate malfeasance.”85 The general public 
was part of the discourse because the entire nation, not just investors, was 
affected by the Corporate Scandals.86 Today’s discourse about SOX, 
however, no longer includes the general public. The general public is 
largely unaware of the business community’s criticism of SOX and the 
changes that criticism inspired. 
One explanation for the public’s ignorance about the Act’s 
shortcomings is found in the dichotomy between what business leaders 
have said about SOX to the public and what they say to each other. Even 
though condemnation of the Act has spread quickly among business 
leaders, “many from the corporate world . . . are reluctant to talk on the 
record and thereby show ‘bad faith’ regarding the [Act].”87 This reluctance 
on the part of business leaders to speak publicly about their disapproval of 
the Act evidences the potential power of the public to influence corporate 
policy. Business leaders are concerned about what the public thinks. They 
care deeply about their public images. But, if corporate leaders are talking 
only among themselves and not on the record about their disdain for SOX, 
public citizens will remain unaware of the political pressure the business 
community is applying on regulators to tone down the Act just a few years 
after its passage. One author, assuming that “[t]he public still has its eye on 
[SOX]”88 wrote that “any open attempts to remove portions of the Act, or 
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even entirely re-work it, are certain to hit a wall of outrage.”89 The wall of 
public outrage, however, has crumbled. 
B. CHANGES IN NEWS COVERAGE OF SOX 
In the immediate aftermath of the Corporate Scandals, corporate 
governance issues were part of news reporting aimed at the general public.90 
Today, criticisms of SOX are almost virulent,91 and they are very 
convincing, but the criticisms are most completely covered in the financial 
press, excluding citizens who do not read business or legal news. Almost all 
of today’s discussions criticizing the Act occur beyond the scrutiny of the 
general public. So far, changes to SOX have been confined to the way the 
Act is interpreted or implemented, but because the public may no longer 
have its “eye on” SOX, even more radical changes that may occur in the 
future are likely to go unnoticed. 
I examined news articles describing the business community’s criticism 
of SOX appearing in three major newspapers—the New York Times, the 
Washington Post, and the Los Angeles Times.92 My goal was to assess how 
the media reported news about criticisms of SOX, including efforts to roll 
back, or pare down, some of its provisions. I wanted to know how the story 
was reported to the general public and whether Americans who are not 
lawyers, accountants, in the business world or part of the investing class 
have easy access to information about the way SOX is criticized, interpreted 
and implemented more than five years after its enactment. 
I found many newspaper reports about the Corporate Scandals in 2002 
and very few in 2007.93 Other scandals relating to stock options 
backdating94 and the mutual fund industry95 have occurred in the years since 
the 2001/2002 scandals, so it is not surprising that there are fewer stories 
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about the Corporate Scandals in 2007. The story of the 2001/2002 scandals 
was several years old in 2007, but news reports describing criticisms of 
SOX in 2007 would have been timely and relevant. The business 
community’s discussion in 2007 criticizing the Act and the accompanying 
calls for paring down certain of its provisions was not as exciting as the 
details of the 2002 Corporate Scandals reporting, but it was an important 
story nevertheless. There were very few articles, however, describing 
criticisms of SOX, efforts to tone down the Act, or changes in interpretation 
of the Act in 2007.96 Moreover, almost all of the 2007 news articles 
reporting criticisms of SOX appeared somewhere in the newspapers’ 
business section, and most times not on the front page of that section. 
Members of the general public who are not part of the legal or business 
communities could easily miss such coverage. This is in sharp contrast to 
newspaper reports in 2002 when a significant number of articles about SOX 
or the Corporate Scandals appeared in the newspapers’ main sections, some 
on the front page, easily accessible to the general public.97 
C. PUBLIC OPINION POLLS 
Legislators, regulators and other policymakers may have overstated the 
level of public outrage even in 2002, the year that SOX was enacted. It 
seems that a segment of the American public was outraged, but it may have 
been slightly less than one-third of the public.98 Presumably, outraged 
citizens would follow news coverage of the corporate scandals very closely, 
but in a survey conducted by the Pew Research Center, only 31% of 
Americans said they followed coverage by news organizations about Enron 
or WorldCom “very closely.”99 Seventeen percent did not follow the story 
closely, 33% followed “fairly closely,” and 18% followed “not too 
closely.”100 
Karlyn Bowman compiled public opinion studies regarding the 
Corporate Scandals for the American Enterprise Institute.101 She noted the 
possibility that two-thirds of the American public may not have followed 
the Corporate Scandals story very closely because SOX had been enacted to 
address the issue.102 The public was perhaps satisfied that the problem was 
resolved by the legislation. She hypothesized, however, that the public’s 
long-standing distrust of business leaders better explained why most 
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Americans did not follow the story very closely.103 According to a survey 
by the Gallup Organization 50% of the American public felt that corporate 
corruption was “always like this.”104 Another survey conducted by Zogby 
International revealed that 64% of American citizens felt that “fraudulent 
and misleading financial reporting by major corporations [has] always been 
commonplace.”105 
Bowman may be right about the public’s opinion that corporate 
corruption was a problem before the 2001 and 2002 scandals, but the 
public’s perception of business executives’ ethical standards dimmed even 
more after hearing and reading about Enron. For example, in 2000, 23% 
gave business executives high marks for honesty and ethical standards.106 In 
2001 (presumably before the story about Enron was uncovered) 25% of 
American citizens rated the honesty and ethical standards of business 
executives “high” or “very high.”107 The portion of American citizens who 
thought that business executives were honest and ethical was low in 2000 
and 2001; but by February 2002, the percentage of Americans who thought 
business executives were honest and ethical dropped to just 16%.108 In any 
event, it is clear that by the middle of 2002, Americans thought very little of 
the ethical standards of business executives. 
In 2004, public opinion regarding big business had not improved.109 
And, in 2005, the public continued to give low marks for the ethical and 
moral practices of corporate leaders.110 The public also continued to believe 
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that corruption affected the “business environment” to a large or moderate 
extent in 2005.111 
In a September 2002 poll, Americans were asked about the legislative 
response to the corporate scandals: 
As you may know, President Bush recently signed into law a measure that 
stiffens criminal penalties against executives who commit corporate fraud 
and sets new regulatory requirements for accounting firms and corporate 
executives. With this new law in effect and enforcement stepped up, do 
you think that enough will have been done to respond to the issue of 
corporate corruption, or should more be done?112 
Only 24% thought that enough had been done. Seventy-one percent thought 
that more should be done.113 Another poll asked Americans the following: 
Thinking for a moment about the corporate scandals that happened earlier 
this year at companies like Enron and WorldCom, how effective do you 
think the measures taken by Congress and federal regulators have been to 
fix these problems - very effective, somewhat effective, not too effective, 
or not effective at all?114 
Only 6% thought SOX and related regulations were “very effective,” and 
40% thought the legislative and regulatory responses were “somewhat 
effective.”115 Thirty-four percent thought the legislation and regulations that 
responded to the Enron and WorldCom scandals were “not too effective,” 
and 16% thought the response was “not effective at all.”116 
As the surveys described above reveal, in the first three years after SOX 
was enacted, many members of the American public thought that corruption 
in the business community was pervasive, and that business leaders were 
not ethical and honest. A large segment of the American public thought that 
the legislative and regulatory responses to the scandals could have been 
more effective. None of the polls that I saw asked Americans whether they 
were outraged by the corporate scandals. The polls, however, clearly 
indicate that big business had a long-standing public image problem that 
worsened with the advent of the 2001/2002 corporate scandals. This is no 
surprise. What is surprising, however, is that news coverage about the 
scandals was not followed more closely by more citizens. In any event, 
even if fewer Americans followed the story very closely than was thought 
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in 2002, business leaders and politicians were concerned that public regard 
for big business would plummet. 
I found no 2006 or 2007 polls asking about the public’s reaction to the 
Corporate Scandals and the resulting legislative and regulatory changes. I 
suspect, that in 2007, even fewer members of the general public, including 
indirect investors, who are not lawyers, accountants or members of the 
business community or the investing public, are following coverage about 
the business community’s criticism of SOX, or the changes that have been 
made in the way the Act is implemented and interpreted. I so conclude 
because these stories are reported primarily in the financial press and legal 
literature that average Americans do not read. 
VI. CONCLUSION: THE EFFECT OF THE LACK OF PUBLIC 
PARTICIPATION IN THE DISCOURSE ABOUT SOX 
In the immediate aftermath of the Corporate Scandals, most of the 
general public was outraged. In 2002 and 2003, because business leaders 
were worried about public outrage concerning corporate malfeasance, SOX 
was able to change more than the details relating to financial reporting, 
internal controls and corporate governance in general. It changed corporate 
climates, at least temporarily. At least in the immediate months after its 
passage, the Act moved discussions about corporate ethics from the 
periphery of corporate discourse to the center.117 
Congress enacted SOX to restore investor confidence, but the Act was 
also a legislative attempt to appease the general public and reduce the 
outrage of American citizens who witnessed and condemned the deplorable 
conduct of a few corporate executives. One of the Act’s goals was to 
assuage the concerns of all Americans, not just investors. Business leaders, 
concerned about their public image, were slow to criticize SOX, and quick 
to respond favorably to calls for more ethical corporate climates.118 Now, 
more than five years after SOX was enacted, much of the public’s outrage 
has turned into apathy. Many average Americans are no longer paying close 
attention. 
There is more than one potential explanation for today’s public apathy 
and ignorance concerning SOX. Perhaps the public is confident that 
legislative and regulatory responses to the Corporate Scandals adequately 
addressed the corporate malfeasance problem. Or, Americans may feel 
impotent in the face of what they perceive as longstanding, continuing, and 
inevitable misconduct on the part of business leaders. Or, the explanation 
may be much simpler. Perhaps the American public is largely unaware of 
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the way SOX is criticized, and the small changes to its interpretation and 
implementation that have resulted from the criticisms, because recent news 
reports on this topic are not easily accessible to the general public.119 
Whatever the explanation, public attention is no longer focused on SOX or 
the Corporate Scandals. In a speech President George W. Bush gave on 
Wall Street about regulatory issues, he said that “[a] free and vibrant 
economy depends on public trust.”120 But, because there is a lack of 
informative media coverage that is likely to reach Americans who are not 
business people, accountants, lawyers or part of the investing class, the 
general public knows little-to-nothing about today’s discussions and 
criticisms concerning SOX. 
One observer wrote that the “lessening of public attention coupled with 
broadening protests on the part of business regarding”121 SOX has resulted 
in the willingness of politicians and regulators to change SOX.122 The 
decrease in public attention, however, impacts more than politicians and 
regulators and their inclination to change the Act. Today’s lack of public 
consciousness about SOX and its critics has a significant impact on 
business leaders. If the public is no longer paying attention, the business 
community no longer needs to concern itself with its public image. This 
dramatically reduces the likelihood that ethical business climates will be at 
the forefront of discussions in the business community. The business 
community’s criticism of SOX, coupled with the lack of public observation, 
has the power to change the nature of compliance with SOX in particular, 
and the way companies discuss and consider ethical issues in general. 
Business leaders complain that SOX was hastily enacted and that its 
benefits are severely outweighed by its costs, thereby reducing the 
competitiveness of U.S. companies in the global economy. The business 
community’s criticism has led its members to challenge the Act’s 
legitimacy. Once individuals deem a law illegitimate, it is likely that their 
compliance will be marginal, or they may not comply at all.123 This means 
that corporate agents’ marginal compliance or noncompliance with the 
details of the Act’s provisions is more likely. This may not be significant if 
SOX’s detractors are right that it is unlikely that the detailed requirements 
under its provisions will improve financial reporting and reduce accounting 
fraud. But SOX’s significance extends beyond its details. The value of SOX 
is found in the reason for its enactment: The public interest is served and 
                                                                                                                 
 119. See discussion supra Part IV.B. 
 120. See John D. McKinnon & Christopher Conkey, Bush Gives Hopes to Foes of Sarbanes-
Oxley Law, WALL ST. J., Feb. 1, 2007, at A4. 
 121. Morrison, supra note 88. Even Eliot Spitzer, former Governor of New York State and 
famous for his crusade against corporate misconduct when he was New York State’s Attorney 
General, joined the chorus of those who say that SOX should be relaxed. Id. 
 122. Id. 
 123. See Donald C. Langevoort, Someplace Between Philosophy and Economics: Legitimacy 
and Good Corporate Lawyering, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1615, 1622–25 (2006). 
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investors are protected if corporate agents focus on the risk that financial 
statements will be materially misleading. Interpretive guidance from the 
SEC and PCAOB focus on this principle of risk.124 But business leaders, 
because they have deemed SOX illegitimate, may ignore not only the Act’s 
details but its underlying principles as well. 
The public determines whether an organization’s noncompliance or 
marginal compliance with law is legitimate.125 This will not occur with 
respect to SOX because the public is excluded from rollback and changing 
interpretation and implementation discussions. Donald Langevoort writes 
that “the good lawyer has to be sensitive to and engage the client’s agents 
on those aspects of the law or regulation that reflect societal expectations of 
appropriate behavior—that is, legitimacy.”126 The corporate lawyer must 
make her client aware of conduct that is inconsistent with “emerging 
societal expectations.”127 There may, however, be no societal expectations 
with respect to the legitimacy of SOX at this point, because most of the 
criticism of SOX is part of a discourse that plays out primarily among 
businesspeople, lawyers, accountants and the investing class, rather than 
society in general. This means that there is no societal determination of the 
legitimacy of marginal or cosmetic compliance with SOX. In fact, societal 
expectations have evolved little since 2002, the year that SOX was enacted. 
Two authors called for citizens to participate in efforts to achieve 
ethical corporate climates by insisting that the companies in which they 
invest engage in good corporate governance practices, “even when markets 
are doing well.”128 Professor Roberta Romano wrote that it is “important to 
work to educate the media, the public, political leaders and agency 
personnel regarding the reality that Congress committed a public policy 
blunder in enacting SOX’s corporate governance mandates and that there is 
a need to rectify the error.”129 SOX should be fixed, the media should 
educate the public about the need to fix it, but its repair should not occur 
beyond public scrutiny. 
                                                                                                                 
 124. See supra notes 55–57 and accompanying text. 
 125. “[I]f conduct inexcusably falls short of societal demands, the firm will lose access to 
important resources and be disadvantaged.” Langevoort, supra note 123, at 1625. 
 126. Id. at 1627. 
 127. Id. 
 128. Harshbarger & Jois, supra note 21, at 7. 
 129. Roberta Romano, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Making of Quack Corporate 
Governance, 114 YALE L.J. 1521, 1603 (2005) (emphasis added). 
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APPENDIX A 
SEARCH METHODOLOGY AND MEDIA SELECTION 
I searched for articles from the New York Times that mentioned in the 
headline or lead paragraph the words “corporate scandal,” “misconduct,” 
“conduct” or “behavior” and any one of the names of the companies 
involved in the Corporate Scandals, i.e., Enron, WorldCom, Tyco or Global 
Crossings, starting December 1, 2001 and ending December 31, 2002. I 
found 207 articles. Most of the articles appeared on the front page of the 
business section (fifty-three), or within the business section (sixty-three), 
but thirty articles appeared on the front page of the newspaper’s main 
section, easily seen by, and accessible to, the general public. Five articles 
appeared inside the main section, also easily seen by the general public. 
Also inside the main section were twenty-one editorials discussing some 
aspect of the Corporate Scandals. 
Some of the New York Times articles appeared in sections of the paper 
(other than the main section) frequently read by members of the general 
public who are not part of the business community. The Week in Review 
section is likely to be read by the general public. This section appears in the 
Sunday edition of the New York Times, which is widely read by members of 
the general public. I found five articles on page one of the Week in Review 
section, and six articles inside that section. Four editorials about the 
Corporate Scandals were published in the Week in Review section of the 
Sunday edition of the New York Times. 
Other 2002 articles appeared in other popular sections likely to be read 
by individuals not involved in law, accounting or business: three articles 
were printed on the front page of the Metropolitan section; four were 
printed inside the Metropolitan section; one appeared on page one of the 
Lifestyle section; one appeared on the front page of the Sports section 
(discussing the renaming of the sports stadium that had been named after 
Enron); one was on the front page of the New Jersey Weekly section; and 
one appeared on the front page of a special Working section. 
I found 183 articles in the Washington Post with the following words in 
the headline or lead paragraph: “corporate scandal,” “misconduct,” 
“conduct” or “behavior” and any one of the names of the companies 
involved in the Corporate Scandals, i.e., Enron, WorldCom, Tyco, or 
Global Crossings, during the time period starting December 1, 2001 and 
ending December 31, 2002. Many of the 2002 Washington Post articles 
were published in the sections most likely to be seen by the general public. 
Unlike the New York Times and the Los Angeles Times, the Washington 
Post carried two articles about Enron in the Magazine section of its Sunday 
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edition. Thirty-two articles appeared on the front page of the newspaper’s 
main section; three were printed on page two of the main section; two 
articles on page three of the main section; and three articles on page four of 
the main section. Also in the Washington Post’s main section were sixteen 
articles about the Corporate Scandals, and thirteen editorials. Ten articles 
were printed in the Washington Post’s Metro section, and four editorials 
appeared in that section. Four items appeared in Outlook, a regular feature 
in the Metro section. Articles about the Corporate Scandals were printed in 
the widely-read Style section of the Washington Post in 2002. Three stories 
appeared on the front page of the Style section, and one on page three of 
that section. 
I found similar results when comparing news coverage in the Los 
Angeles Times in 2002 with coverage in 2007. I searched for articles with 
the words “scandal,” “misconduct,” “conduct” or “behavior,” appearing in 
the headline or lead paragraph of articles that also mentioned Enron, 
WorldCom, Tyco or Global Crossings in the headline or lead paragraph. 
This search included articles from December 1, 2001 to December 31, 
2002. I found 216 articles. Most of them appeared in the paper’s Business 
section. I found, however, that in 2002, forty-one articles appeared on the 
front page of the main section of the Los Angeles Times, easily seen by 
members of the general public who may not read the paper’s Business 
section. Also likely to be seen by the general public were nineteen articles 
inside the newspaper’s main section. Members of the general public who do 
not regularly read business news may more regularly read the Los Angeles 
Times California Metro section. In the California Metro section, one article 
was printed on the section’s first page, and twelve articles appeared inside 
the California Metro section. The California Metro section also contained 
eleven editorials or commentaries touching on a variety of issues relating to 
the Corporate Scandals. One article about changing the name of Enron 
Field to Astros Field appeared in the Sports section. 
I performed the same search for New York Times articles that mentioned 
in the headline or lead paragraph the words “corporate scandal,” 
“misconduct,” “conduct” or “behavior” and any one of the names of the 
companies involved in the Corporate Scandals, i.e., Enron, WorldCom, 
Tyco or Global Crossings, for 2007. I found only thirteen articles. Only one 
of the thirteen articles appeared on the front page of the main section; four 
were printed on the front page of the Business section; six appeared inside 
that section; two were editorials that appeared inside the main section. I 
found two additional articles when I looked for “Sarbanes” appearing in an 
article’s headline or lead paragraph with the names Enron, WorldCom, 
Tyco or Global Crossings, in 2007. Both appeared inside the Business 
section. 
As with the New York Times and the Los Angeles Times, the 
Washington Post published far fewer articles about the Corporate Scandals 
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and their aftermath in 2007. I duplicated the search I had done in 2002 to 
find articles in 2007. I found eight articles about the Corporate Scandals 
when I searched during the time period starting January 1, 2007 and ending 
December 31, 2007. Seven of the eight articles appeared on the front page 
of the paper’s Financial section; one appeared on page three of that section. 
When I modified my search to find “Sarbanes” in the headline or lead 
paragraph with the names Enron, WorldCom, Tyco or Global Crossing for 
the time period starting January 1, 2007 and ending December 31, 2007, I 
found seven articles in the Washington Post. Four of the articles appeared in 
the newspaper’s Financial section, one was printed in the main section, and 
one editorial appeared in the main section. 
I performed in 2007 the same search I did in 2002 in the Los Angeles 
Times. After searching the time frame beginning January 1, 2007 and 
ending December 31, 2007, I found only four articles. Each of the four 
articles appeared inside the Business section of the Los Angeles Times. 
When I changed the search for 2007 articles in the Los Angeles Times by 
looking for the word “Sarbanes” appearing with Enron, WorldCom, Tyco, 
or Global Crossings, I found seven articles, six in the Business section, and 
one editorial in the paper’s main section. 
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APPENDIX B: ARTICLES PUBLISHED IN 2002 
THE NEW YORK TIMES 
ARTICLES APPEARING AT THE FRONT PAGE OF THE MAIN SECTION: 
Gretchen Morgenson, Enron’s Collapse: News Analysis; A Bubble 
No One Wanted to Pop, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 14, 2002, at A1 
Richard A. Oppel, Jr. & Kurt Eichenwald, Enron’s Collapse: The 
Overview; Arthur Andersen Fires an Executive For Enron Orders, N.Y. 
TIMES, Jan. 16, 2002, at A1 
Richard W. Stevenson & Richard A. Oppel, Jr., Enron’s Many 
Strands: The Overview; U.S. To Reconsider Agency Contracts in Enron 
Scandal, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 26, 2002, at A1 
Alex Berenson, The Markets: Stocks & Bonds; Bearson Prowl As 
Market Ends A Dreary Week, N.Y. TIMES, July 13, 2002, at A1 
Stephen Labaton, Bush Tries to Shrink S.E.C. Raise Intended for 
Corporate Cleanup, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 19, 2002, at A1 
Diana B. Henriques & Geraldine Fabrikant, Deciding on Executive 
Pay: Lack of Independence Seen, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 18, 2002, at A1 
Gretchen Morgenson & Patrick McGeehan, Corporate Conduct: 
The Overview; Wall Street Firms are Ready to Pay $1 Billion in Fines, 
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 20, 2002, at A1 
Elisabeth Bumiller, Corporate Conduct: The President; Bush Signs 
Bill Aimed at Fraud in Corporations, N.Y. TIMES, July 31, 2002, at A1 
David E. Sanger & David E. Rosenblum, Corporate Conduct: 
Washington Memo; White House Moves to Limit Corporate Scandals’ 
Fallout, N.Y. TIMES, July 25, 2002, at A1 
Richard A. Oppel, Jr., Corporate Conduct: The Overview; 
Negotiators Agree on Broad Changes in Business Laws, N.Y. TIMES, 
July 25, 2002, at A1 
David Leonard, Corporate Conduct: The Impact; Is Uncertainty 
The Only Thing That Is Certain?, N.Y. TIMES, July 17, 2002, at A1 
David Sanger & Richard A. Oppel, Jr., Corporate Conduct: The 
Overview; Senate Approves a Broad Overhaul of Business Laws, N.Y. 
TIMES, July 16, 2002, at A1 
Richard A. Oppel, Jr., Corporate Conduct: Congress; G.O.P. In 
Congress Moving Past Bush on Business Fraud, N.Y. TIMES, July 12, 
2002, at A1 
Richard A. Oppel Jr., Corporate Conduct: The Legislation; Senate 
Backs Tough Measures To Punish Corporate Misdeeds, N.Y. TIMES, 
July 11, 2002, at A1 
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David E. Sanger, Corporate Conduct: The Overview; Bush on Wall 
St., Offers Tough Stance, N.Y. TIMES, July 10, 2002, at A1 
Floyd Norris, Corporate Conduct: News Analysis; Hard Talk, 
Softer Plans, N.Y. TIMES, July 10, 2002, at A1 
Elisabeth Bumiller & Richard A. Oppel, Jr., Corporate Conduct: 
The President; Bush Defends Sale of Stock and Vows to Enhance 
S.E.C., N.Y. TIMES, July 9, 2002, at A1 
David Leonard, Corporate Conduct: Compensation; Anger at 
Executives’ Profits Fuels Support for Stock Curb, N.Y. TIMES, July 9, 
2002, A1 
Richard W. Stevenson, Corporate Conduct: News Analysis; Old 
Business In New Light, N.Y. TIMES, July 9, 2002, A1 
Richard W. Stevenson & Alison Mitchell, Turmoil At WorldCom: 
The Politics; Parties Maneuver Over Risks In Growing Business 
Scandal, N.Y. TIMES, June 28, 2002, at A1 
Kurt Eichenwald & Simon Romero, Turmoil at WorldCom: The 
Decision Making; The Latest Corporate Scandal Is Sudden, Vast and 
Simple, N.Y. TIMES, June 27, 2002, at A1 
Simon Romero, Turmoil At WorldCom: The Overview; WorldCom 
Facing Charges Of Fraud; Inquiries Expand, N.Y. TIMES, June 27, 
2002, at A1 
Simon Romero & Alex Berenson, WorldCom Says It Hid Expenses, 
Inflating Cash For $3.8 Billion, N.Y. TIMES, June 26, 2002, at A1 
Stephen Labaton & Richard A. Oppel, Jr., Enthusiasm Waning In 
Congress For Tougher Post-Enron Controls, N.Y. TIMES, June 10, 
2002, at A1 
Kurt Eichenwald, Andersen May Find Its Fate In Hands of the Man 
It Fired, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 25, 2002, at A1 
Kurt Eichenwald, Enron’s Many Strands: News Analysis; Talk of 
Crime Gets Big Push, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 4, 2002, at A1 
Gretchen Morgenson, Enron’s Collapse: News Analysis; A Bubble 
No One Wanted to Pop, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 14, 2002, at A1 
Kurt Eichenwald, Enron’s Collapse; Audacious Climb to Success 
Ended in a Dizzying Plunge, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 13, 2002, at A1 
Kurt Eichenwald & Jonathan D. Later, Justice Dept. to Form Task 
Force To Investigate Collapse of Enron, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 10, 2002, at 
A1 
Stephen Labaton, Praise to Scorn: Mercurial Ride Of S.E.C. Chief, 
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 10, 2002, § 1, at 1.  
ARTICLES APPEARING INSIDE THE MAIN SECTION 
Patrick McGeehan, Solomon Smith Barney Chief Ousted in 
Citigroup Shuffle, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 9, 2002, at A20 
2008] Sarbanes-Oxley & Ethical Corporate Climates 447 
Steven Greenhouse, Workers Are Angry and Fearful This Labor 
Day, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 2, 2002, at A12 
Evelyn Nieves & Elisabeth Bumiller, In Twin Speeches, Bush and 
Cheney Vow to Fight Fraud, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 8, 2002, at A21 
Louis Uchitelle, Enron’s Many Strands: The Buzz; World 
Economic Forum Plays Down the Scandal, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 4, 2002, 
at A20 
Paul Zielbauer, Enron Political Scandal? In Connecticut, Hardly, 
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 7, 2002, § 1, at 32 (appearing in the widely-read 
Sunday edition) 
EDITORIALS IN THE MAIN SECTION  
A Rudderless S.E.C., N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 3, 2002, at A30 
John McCain, The Free Market Needs New Rules, N.Y. TIMES, July 
8, 2002, at A19 
Robert H. Frank, The Case For Sanctions, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 24, 
2002, at A13  
A Bankrupt Bill, N.Y. TIMES, July 27, 2002, at A10 
Lester C. Thurow, Government Can’t Make the Market Fair, N.Y. 
TIMES, July 23, 2002, at A19 
Kevin Phillips, The Cycles of Financial Scandal, N.Y. TIMES, July 
17, 2002, at A19 
Hedrick Smith, Market Crisis Management, N.Y. TIMES, June 20, 
2002, at A25 
Blunt Talk by an Investment Banker, N.Y. TIMES, June 7, 2002, at 
A26 
Paul Krugman, Greed Is Bad, N.Y. TIMES, June 4, 2002, at A19 
Reformers All, in Enron’s Wake, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 2, 2002, at A18 
Bill Keller, Enron for Dummies, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 26, 2002, at A15 
A New Rallying Cry for Reform, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 22, 2002, at A18 
James Kunen, Enron’s Vision (and Values) Thing, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 
19, 2002, at A19 
Holding Lawyers Accountable, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 15, 2002, at A22 
Phillip L. Zweig, Learning Old Lessons From a New Scandal, N.Y. 
TIMES, Feb. 2, 2002, at A19 
Arthur Levitt, Who Audits the Auditors?, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 17, 
2002, at A29 
David Callahan, Private Sector, Public Doubts, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 
15, 2002, at A21 
Bob Herbert, Joined at the Hip, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 10, 2002, at A27 
Adam Cohen, Before WorldCom, the Funeral Industry Set the 
Standard for Venality, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 3, 2002, at A18 
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David Skeel & William Stuntz, Another Attempt to Legislate 
Corporate Honesty, N.Y. TIMES, July 10, 2002, at A21 
Business Scandals Are About Politics, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 23, 2002, 
at A14 
ARTICLES APPEARING ON THE FRONT PAGE OF THE WEEK IN 
REVIEW SECTION  
Louis Uchitelle, In Name Only; Call It the (Pick Your Poison) 
Recovery, N.Y. TIMES, July 7, 2002, § 4, at 1 
Kurt Eichenwald, The Nation: Clay Feet; Could Capitalists 
Actually Bring Down Capitalism?, N.Y. TIMES, June 30, 2002, § 4, at 1 
Alex Berenson, The Nation: Scream!; Hold On for a Wild Ride, 
N.Y. TIMES, July 21, 2002, § 4, at 1;  
Richard L. Berke, Ideas & Trends: Power House; Greed, Pain, 
Excesses. Oh, What a Lovely Issue, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 27, 2002, § 4, at 1 
Don Van Natta Jr., The World: School for Scandal; Trying To Pass 
Damage Control 101, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 13, 2002, § 4, at 1 
ARTICLES APPEARING INSIDE THE WEEK IN REVIEW SECTION 
David Leonard, The Nation; The Boom Was Real. But So Were Its 
Mirages, N.Y. TIMES, June 9, 2002, § 4, at 4 
Janny Scott, Ideas & Trends; Once Bitten, Twice Shy: A World of 
Eroding Trust, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 21, 2002, § 4, at 5 
Kurt Eichenwald, The Nation; White-Collar Defense Stance: The 
Criminal-less Crime, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 3, 3002, § 4, at 3 
Jonathan D. Later, The Nation: Is the Law an Ass?; Corporate 
Greed Turns Lawyers Into Heroes, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 3, 2002, § 4, at 6 
Kurt Eichenwald, Business; Enron Watch, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 27, 
2002, § 4, at 2;  
Diana B. Henriques, Ideas & Trends; Those Old-Time Shares Are 
Looking Good Again, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 18, 2002, § 4, at 6 
EDITORIALS APPEARING IN THE WEEK IN REVIEW SECTION 
Andrew Kohut, Increasingly, It’s the Economy That Scares Us, 
N.Y. TIMES, July 14, 2002, § 4, at 15 
Underwriting Fraud, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 25, 2002, § 4, at 8 
Campaign Reform’s ‘Armageddon’, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 10, 2002, 
§ 4, at 14 
Other People’s Money, N.Y. TIMES, May 19, 2002, § 4, at 14 
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OTHER 2002 ARTICLES APPEARING IN OTHER POPULAR SECTIONS 
LIKELY TO BE READ BY INDIVIDUALS NOT INVOLVED IN LAW, 
ACCOUNTING OR BUSINESS 
John Tierney, The Big City; Blame Game Has Two Sets Of 
Standards, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 18, 2002, at B1 
Richard Perez-Pena, Business Woes Add Scrutiny To Campaigns, 
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 13, 2002, at B1 
Clyde Haberman, NYC: Dark Days For Ethics Of All Stripes, N.Y. 
TIMES, Aug. 16, 2002, at B1 
Shaila K. Dewan, Cuomo Calls for Restricting Corporate Political 
Contributions, N.Y. TIMES, July 10, 2002, at B2 
Charles V. Bagli, Troubles at Arthur Andersen Threaten Times 
Square Deal, N.Y. TIMES, March 12, 2002, at B4 
Richard Perez-Pena, Candidate for Lieutenant Governor Facing 
Scrutiny Over Business Dealings, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 10, 2002, at B2 
David Kocieniewski, Trenton to Sue Four Companies Over State 
Pension Fund Losses, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 26, 2002, at B5 
Rachel Lehmann-Haupt & Warren St. John, Corporate Bad Guys 
Make Many Seek the Road Less Traveled, N.Y. TIMES, July 21, 2002, 
§ 9, at 1 (appearing in the widely-read Sunday edition) 
Edward Wong, Baseball; Astros’ Ballpark No Longer Enron Field, 
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 28, 2002, at D4 
Neil Genzlinger, Jersey; High Thoughts, Low Behavior and Tiger 
Bites, N.Y. TIMES, July 21, 2002, § 14NJ, at 1 
Steven Greenhouse, The Mood at Work: Anger and Anxiety, N.Y. 
TIMES, Oct. 29, 2002, at G1 
 
THE WASHINGTON POST 
ARTICLES APPEARING ON FRONT PAGE OF MAIN SECTION 
Kathleen Day, President Names Insider to Lead SEC, WASH. POST, 
Dec. 11, 2002, at A1 
Christopher Stern & Brooke A. Masters, WorldCom Agrees to 
Continuing Oversight, WASH. POST, Nov. 27, 2002, at A1 
David S. Hitzenrath & Shannon Henry, SEC Chief Is Subject of 
Probe, WASH. POST, Nov. 1, 2002, at A1 
Eric Pianin, Bitter Colo. Race Is All Business, WASH. POST, Oct. 
19, 2002, at A1 
Jonathan Weisman, At Firms, Dual Profit Pictures, WASH. POST, 
Oct. 10, 2002, at A1 
Ariana Eunjung Cha, Corporate Scandals Tainting Donations, 
WASH. POST, Sept. 15, 2002, at A1 
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Howard Kurtz, Solemnity Slips Under the Covers, WASH. POST, 
Sept. 2, 2002, at A1 
Alec Klein & Dan Eggen, U.S. Opens Criminal AOL Probe, WASH. 
POST, Aug. 1, 2002, at A1 
Juliet Eilperin & Jonathan Weisman, Congress Targets Tax 
Havens; House Vote Shows Perception of Corporate Abuse, WASH. 
POST, July 30, 2002, at A1 
Jim VandeHei & David S. Hilzenrath, Hill Leaders Agree on 
Corporate Curbs, WASH. POST, July 25, 2002, at A1 
Robert E. Pierre & Kari Lydersen, Stocks Sliding, but Sales Aren’t, 
WASH. POST, July 20, 2002, at A1 
David S. Hilzenrath & Helen Dewar, Senate Votes 97-0 To Rein In 
Firms, WASH. POST, July 16, 2002, at A1 
Jim VandeHei & Juliet Eilperin, Political Caution in Zeal for 
Reform; Hill Plays Down Its Pro-Business Past, WASH. POST, July 13, 
2002, at A1  
David S. Hilzenrath & Helen Dewar, United Senate Passes Anti-
Fraud Measures, WASH. POST, July 11, 2002, at A1 
Steven Pearlstein, Measures Not Likely to End Abuses, WASH. 
POST, July 10, 2002, at A1 
Jonathan Krim & Christopher Stern, 2 Key WorldCom Witnesses 
Silent, WASH. POST, July 9, 2002, at A1 
David S. Hilzenrath, Senate Set For Action To Reform Audit Sector; 
Corporate Scandals Spur Call for Tougher Rules, WASH. POST, July 7, 
2002, at A1 
Dana Milbank, Bush SEC Delay Called ‘Mix-Up’, WASH. POST, 
July 4, 2002, at A1 
Dana Milbank, In Growing Bad News, Risk for Bush and GOP, 
WASH. POST, June 28, 2002, at A1 
Steven Pearlstein, Corporate Scandals Taking Toll On Markets, 
WASH. POST, June 26, 2002, at A1 
Jackie Spinner, Sullied Accounting Firms Regaining Political 
Clout, WASH. POST, May 12, 2002, at A1 
David S. Hilzenrath, Andersen’s CEO to Resign, WASH. POST, Mar. 
27, 2002, at A1 
Susan Schmidt & David S. Hilzenrath, Andersen Chared in 
Shredding Probe, WASH. POST, Mar. 15, 2002, at A1 
Carrie Johnson, Enron Case Shapes Up As Tough Legal Fight, 
WASH. POST, Feb. 18, 2002, at A1 
Dana Milbank, Bush Is Quiet in Campaign Bill Fight, WASH. POST, 
Feb. 10, 2002, at A1 
Paul Duggan & Lois Romano, Enron Official Shaken In Days 
Before Suicide, WASH. POST, Feb. 9, 2002, at A1 
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Peter Behr, How Chewco Brought Down an Empire, WASH. POST, 
Feb. 4, 2002, at A1 
Juliet Eilperin, & Helen Dewar, Campaign Bill Heads For a Vote 
In House, WASH. POST, Jan. 25, 2002, at A1 
Anne Hull, For Enron Families, Dreams and Faith Lost, WASH. 
POST, Jan. 20, 2002, at A1 
Peter Behr, Chairman Told Workers Stock Was ‘Bargain’, WASH. 
POST, Jan. 19, 2002, at A1 
David S. Hilzenrath & Peter Behr, Enron Chief Got Early Warning, 
WASH. POST, Jan. 15, 2002, at A1 
Mike Allen, Firm’s Saga Could Dog Bush in Election Year, WASH. 
POST, Jan. 11, 2002, at A1 
ARTICLES APPEARING IN THE MAIN SECTION 
Edward Walsh, Hopes High in House For Campaign Reform, 
WASH. POST, Feb. 11, 2002, at A2 
Susan Schmidt & David S. Hilzenrath, Enron’s Watkins Advised 
Lay on How to Blame Others, WASH. POST, Feb. 14, 2002, at A2 
Bush Cites Fraud Crackdown, WASH. POST, Sept. 27, 2002, at A2 
Mary Mcgrory, Claws for Alarm, WASH. POST, Jan. 17, 2002, at A3 
Arthur Andersen Indicted, WASH. POST, Mar. 17, 2002, at A3 
Jonathan Weisman, U.S. Deficit Ballooning, but Not as a Hot Issue, 
WASH. POST, Aug. 25, 2002, at A4 
Richard Morin, More Curbs on Business Sought, WASH. POST, July 
2, 2002, at A4  
Mike Allen, Corporate Penalties Weighed; Bush to Unveil Stiffer 
Standards Against Fraud, Deception, WASH. POST, July 2, 2002, at A4 
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